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THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND THE
GENERATION-SKIPPING TAX: DO WE
NEED BOTH?
LEONARD LEVIN*
MICHAEL MULRONEY* *

I.

INTRODUCTION

A

TTEMPTS to control wealth from beyond the grave are
nearly as old as the law of property ownership.' These attempts have been made for several reasons: to create and perpetuate family control; to assure continuation of an owner's
cherished project after his or her death; to satisfy a primordial
instinct for immortality; or, more recently, to avoid federal tax.
In response, almost from the beginning of modern real property institutions, 2 there has been overt governmental recognition
that it is undesirable to permit the unrestrained freeze of property
ownership in the hands of subsequent owners in modes that are
inflexible or obsolete.3 From the middle ages to the present, each
device to establish ownership perpetually or for protracted periods has been met, either judicially or legislatively, by a counter4
vailing device to assure free alienability.
Thatprocess of initiative and counter-initiative which flow* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.S., J.D., University of Pennsylvania.
* * Professor of Law, Director, Graduate Tax Program, Villanova University
School of Law. B.S.C., State University of Iowa; J.D., Harvard University.
1. These attempts to control wealth from beyond the grave are often labeled acts of "the dead hand." See Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 23 (E. Halbach ed. 1977). In his
essay, Professor Friedman identifies, behind historical redefinitions of the issue,
a constant concern over the use of the dead hand to amass or maintain excessive
power. Id. at 23-25.
2. Real property is historically the most significant form of wealth. By the
end of the 13th century, for example, when English land law had begun to work
out the doctrine of estates as the primary basis for classifying interests in land,
land holding was inseparably connected with personal and political status in the
community. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 25 (2d
ed. 1988); see also Friedman, supra note 1, at 17.
3. See Friedman, supra note 1, at 23-25 (discussing statutes enacted to restrain creation of dynastic personal fortunes and Congress' repeated investigations of charitable foundations).
4. For a historically-oriented survey of the tension between attempts to establish perpetual control over ownership and devices to ensure free alienability,
see C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2.

(333)
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ered among the states in the highest tradition of the common law
now has an added dimension: federal involvement. Explicitly or
implicitly, the federal government has become a participant
5
through evolving principles of federal tax expediency.
Federal tax provisions are designated to serve a revenue-raising function or to mitigate perceived imbalances or incongruities
in the tax system. However, where federal taxation touches the
passage of assets to and through succeeding human generations,
the federal tax law has served as a mechanism for limiting the
ability of the wealthy to continue to control their assets over periods of time which Congress has deemed unreasonable. Guided
by the imperative to raise federal revenue and by the desire to
limit inordinate amalgamation of wealth through inheritance,
Congress utilized the tax system. 6
This use of the tax system is part of one of two parallel movements which has developed in recent times: the ongoing dismantling or prevention of restraints on property alienation as a matter
of state real property law, and the federal estate tax-oriented disincentives to the untaxed accumulation and perpetuation of tangible and intangible wealth. The development of these movements
is apparently based on a similar societal concern: the impermissible concentration of wealth occasioned by legal rules that order
the transmission of wealth as a result of death. A comparison of
the two movements, wholly dissimilar in origin and application
but arising from the same policy, suggests that select elements of
7
each could be combined in one system.
5. For a general perspective on taxation of the wealth distribution process,
(E. Halbach ed. 1977).
6. The first modern federal estate tax was enacted in 1916. 39 Stat. 777-80,
1002 (1916). (There were very less sophisticated attempts made in 1862 and
1894.) The tax on estates was part of a design to offset a decline in customs
duties, then one of the mainstays of federal revenue, resulting from the European war, and "the extraordinary increase in the appropriations for the Army
and Navy and the fortification of our country." H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1916). The estate tax rate was initially graduated from 1% to 5%
with a $50,000 exemption, effectively excluding a considerable majority of the
population from its reach. Id. at 5. Congress deemed it just to collect the "necessary revenues . . . from the incomes and inheritances of those deriving the
most benefit and protection from the Government." Id. at 3. The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the estate tax in New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
7. One possible explanation for the parallel development of the two systems of control without any attempt to coordinate them has been the development of two independent specialities in the areas of property law and the law of
federal taxation. An indication of the gap between the two groups can best be
illustrated from a note appended by Professor Barton Leach, a noted scholar in
the property area, to a chapter dealing with the taxation of powers of appointsee

DEATH, TAxES AND FAMILY PROPERTY
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RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

One of the primary methods of preventing restraints on the
alienation of property is embodied in the Rule Against Perpetuities.8 The Rule applies its sanction in an all-or-nothing fashion;
either the interest is left totally unaffected or it is entirely invalidated. One of the primary disincentives to the untaxed accumulation of wealth is the generation-skipping tax. 9 This tax, at least to
a limited extent, applies its sanction incrementally. A comparison
of the two measures raises an interesting question: What if an
incremental approach were applied in the perpetuities area?
Also, since the generation-skipping tax in part encourages the
end it is conceptually designed to discourage, namely, the appreciation in value of property held by the same family through succeeding generations, should it be revised? And if yes, could such
a revised statute also further the purpose served by The Rule?
As modern readers may be somewhat less familiar with the
historical antecedents of The Rule than with the generation-skipping tax, and because the development of The Rule has spanned
centuries while that of the tax has yet to survive a generation, the
first part of this article describes in detail the development of The
Rule. Against that backdrop, the second part considers the origins of the generation-skipping tax. The final section of this article addresses the questions presented.
II.

LIVES IN BEING PLUS

21 YEARS: THE HISTORICAL

BACKGROUND OF THE PERPETUITY LIMITATION

For centuries The Rule operated in the common law of property as the primary social device for limiting objectionable longterm control over property. The Rule, however, did not arise in a
vacuum. It developed as an episodic outgrowth of centuries of
action and counteraction.
After the landmark act of Parliament, "Quia Emptores,"' 0
ment in a case book which he coauthored with Professor James K. Logan, a tax
expert:
This chapter is the work of my co-author; I simply couldn't have done
it. There are those who joyously eat up this tax business, and thank
goodness Logan is one of these. There are others, including myself,
who find it very hard going and approach the matter with a slight feeling of nausea.
B.

LEACH

&J.

LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING

506 (1961).

8. For a discussion of The Rule Against Perpetuities, see infra notes 38-65
and accompanying text. The Rule Against Perpetuities will be hereinafter referred to as "The Rule."
9. For a discussion of the generation-skipping tax, see infra notes 66-119
and accompanying text.
10. 1290, 18 Edw. 1, ch. 1. The act was designed to preserve the feudal
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the holder of a tenurial interest could not only pass the interest
on to the next generation through his eldest son but he could
also, during his own lifetime, substitute another for himself in the
tenurial scheme. 1 ' This practice enabled an owner, through a
voluntary transfer, to disinherit his descendants.
Almost concurrently, landowners attempted to make their tenurial holdings immune from the present holder's power to disinherit a future generation by providing that the property should
pass solely to the holder's descendants. 2 These property owners
intended to terminate the tenurial interest in the absence of such
descendants, so that by necessary implication the present holder
would be denied the power to disinherit future generations.
Early common law judges frustrated that effort by creating a
new, artificial real property interest, the fee simple conditional.' 3
A gift from "A to B and the heirs of his body" created a fee simple
conditional; the courts construed such a gift to be conditional on
B having an heir of his body. Thus, instead of the gift perpetually
remaining in the hands of B and his heirs, a full alienable interest
was conferred upon B as soon as he had a child who was born
alive. Undoubtedly such a result often was not what the grantor
intended. It did, however, further the purpose of limiting the
ability of a few large families to expand and perpetuate their
property ownership. 14
overlords' rights or "feudal incidents" (such as homage, aid, marriage, relief,
escheat and wardship). T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
31 (5th ed. 1956). For a discussion of feudal incidents, see C. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 2, at 15-18, 531-45.
11. Under Quia Emptores, one who had tenure under a full fee could not
convey a subtenancy to another but could only provide for a successor to substitute for him in the feudal chain. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 19. This
paved the way for the notion of a modern conveyance by making clear that even
without the overlord's consent one with a freehold tenancy in fee could effectively pass on his tenurial rights to another. Id.
12. See L. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 8 (2d ed.
1966).
13. See id.; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 68-77 (1936); see also C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 34-35; cf. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 10, at 550-51 (discussing
conditional fees as precursor to fee tails).
14. Although the point has not been documented, the authors speculate
that it is not entirely coincidental that the judges who created the result were
agents of the Crown which felt threatened by a perpetuation and concentration
of land holdings in the hands of the barons. Land tenures represented political
power as well as the real wealth of the realm. The intended purpose of the fee
simple conditional could thus be seen as a device to avoid concentrating land
tenure in the hands of a relatively few families whose power might thus rival that
of the King. Encouragement of land transfers, on the other hand, would tend to
diffuse such holdings and limit the potentially competing power of the important
feudal families.
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Early dissatisfaction with judicial construction that created
the fee simple conditional led Parliament (which tended to be
representative of large feudal land holders) to enact a statute
known by the Latin words of its preamble, "De Donis."' 5 It directed that the estate created could pass only to the direct lineals
of the first taker, and that the estate would terminate if no such
lineals existed. The Statute De Donis therefore gave rise to the
fee tail.

16

For 200 years the Statute De Donis largely accomplished its
intended purpose. Finally, in the 15th century, the lawyers of the
day, with the wholehearted cooperation (and perhaps the conni7
vance) of the judiciary, circumvented the statute's intent.'
Through the highly fictitious and artificial use of the old common
law suits of Fine or Common Recovery,' 8 courts held that the
owner of a fee tail in possession had the power to transfer a fee
simple absolute to a successor and thus destroy the subsequent
interests which purportedly had been created with the fee tail.' 9
This was true regardless of whether such interest had remained in
the donor as a reversion or had passed to another as a
20
remainder.
The practical effect of the Fine or Common Recovery was to
"bar the entails" and thereby vest a full fee simple absolute in the
15. 1285, 13 Edw. 1, ch. 1.
16. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 34-37. If a donor created an estate
"to A and the heirs of his body" it was inheritable only by his direct lineal descendants. In the absence of descendants, the estate came to an end and the
interest passed to an alternately named taker by way of reversion or remainder.
Moreover, it soon became possible to describe with greater particularity the
heirs who could take. Thus, a donor related solely to a woman (who in the custom of the time might not be thought of as an appropriate person to receive a
land tenure) might create a fee tail special by providing for an estate "to A and
the heirs of his body by his wife W." Again, the absence of persons meeting the
described class of descendants would cause the estate thus created to come to an
end.
17. See Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. 4, fo. 19 (1472).
18. For a brief description of fines and common recoveries, two forms of
conveyance by judicial proceeding, see T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 10, at 613-15,
617-22.
19. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 36; see also T. PLUCKNEr, supra note
10, at 619-22.
20. Tatalarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. 4, fo. 19 (1472) (discussed in C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 36).
Thus, a gift simply "to A and the heirs of his body" created a reversion
following the fee tail for A; the reversion remained in the transferor or passed as
a part of his estate. It would also be possible for the gift to provide: "to A and
the heirs of his body and in default of such heirs to B and his heirs." In this
instance A would still have a fee tail but the interest created for B following the
termination of such fee tail would be, by definition, a remainder.
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fee tail owner's successor in interest. Still later, the owner of the
fee tail could create in his grantee a full fee simple by making a
"conveyance to bar the entails" without resort to a fictitious law
suit. 2 1 Once the fee tail could be destroyed, it no longer played a
22
significant role in Anglo-American property law.

A number of other technical rules of conveyancing arose as a
result of the continuing clash between those who wished to preserve their lands for future generations, and those who wished to
make land freely alienable. One of these rules provided that no
future interest in a freehold could be created for one other than
the grantor unless the interest qualified as a remainder. By definition, a prior freehold, subject to normal termination, consisting
of either a life estate or, during the historic period, a fee tail, had
to precede or "support" a remainder. 23 The supporting estate
requirement was carried to the logical extreme of making a contingent remainder subject to destruction if the condition for its
taking effect was not fully resolved by the time that such prior or
"supporting" estate had terminated. 24
21. See C.

MOYNIHAN,

supra note 2, at 36.

22. See generally id. at 37-39. In Pennsylvania the legislature eliminated the
fee tail in 1855 by mandating that all interests that would otherwise have been
treated as a fee tail were automatically enlarged into a fee simple. The statutory
provision is presently incorporated into the Pennsylvania Probate Code. See 20
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6116 (Purdon 1975). It is of historic interest, however,
that as early as 1799 the Pennsylvania legislature had confirmed the power of a
tenant in tail to make a conveyance "to bar the entails," apparently without going through the fiction of an action of Fine or Common Recovery. See Act of
1799, 3 Sm. L. 338, § 1 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 13 (Purdon 1955)).
For a survey of how each state has modified the common law fee tail, see
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY

§§ 79-86 (1936 & Supp. 1989). A very few states

have retained the fee tail with liberal power to destroy it by conveyance to bar
the entails. Most states have either (1) automatically converted attempted fee
tails into fee simple absolutes or (2) permitted the interest to endure for a single
generation, thus in effect conferring upon the first taker a life estate and a remainder in fee upon his children.
23. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 119. Blackstone identified three requirements for a remainder: (1) it must be supported by a precedent estate
which was less than a full fee; (2) it must be created out of the same instrument
that created the precedent estate; and (3) it must vest instantly on the natural
termination of the precedent estate. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *318-21.
24. For a general discussion of the history and present status of the destructibility of contingent remainders, see L. SIMES, supra note 12, at 33-42. The doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders plays a negligible role in
modern estates law. Many states have explicitly rejected the doctrine. See id. at
41-42. Even states that have not expressly repudiated it traditionally apply it
only to legal contingent interests in real estate. Since most modern estates consist of investment securities and involve a trust, no question of destructibility
arises. Thus, in Pennsylvania (which is generally considered as retaining the
doctrine) there have been no cases decided in the appellate courts since Stehman v. Stehman, 1 Watts 466 (Pa. 1833) (contingent remainder "gone for ever"
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Often the holder of a life estate was the eldest son of the
donor or testator. This son would also inherit the reversion that
arose through the creation of a life estate and a contingent remainder which was typically created for the donor or testator's
nonexistent potential grandchildren. If, during his lifetime the
eldest son could succeed in terminating his life estate, he could
also destroy the contingent remainder. That would leave him
with the reversion, an interest he would hold in fee simple absolute. Also, if the life tenant transferred his life estate and reversion to a third person, the two interests would then merge and
extinguish the life estate, the separate interest that supported the
remainder. The third person would then own a fee simple interest. Moreover, courts continued to recognize the old feudal doctrine of "tortious feoffment," an attempt by a life tenant to convey
a greater interest than his tenure would support. 2 5 The courts
construed this to be a forfeiture of the existing tenurial interest of
the life tenant. That forfeiture, in turn, would bring about the
26
premature termination of the life estate.
The Rule in Shelly's Case and the Doctrine of Worthier Title
also aided the extinguishment of remainder interests. If a remainder were limited to the heirs of the life tenant, under the
Rule in Shelly's Case 27 the life tenant took both the life estate and
remainder in fee simple. No rights were created in the heirs. A
similar result occurred when the remainder was limited to the
heirs of the donor or testator. Under the Doctrine of Worthier
and estate irrevocably vests at termination of life estate). Should a case arise
under modern law it seems doubtful that the doctrine would be applied, even
though. the Stehman case appears to be the last word on the subject.
25. See L. SIMES, supra note 12, at 34-35 (discussing Archer's Case, 1 Co.
Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 (1597)).
26. See Stehman, 1 Watts 466 (Pa. 1833); C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 13536. Many estate planners of the day avoided such destruction by inserting in the
instrument an intervening supporting estate by way of a trust to preserve contingent remainders. See id. at 137-38.
For example, after providing for a legal life estate for his son, the testator
would next provide for a life estate in the name of the lawyer in trust for the life
of the son. If the son destroyed his life estate in the fashion described in the
text, the contingent remainder would not be destroyed because the estate held
by the lawyer in trust for the life of the son would remain as a supporting estate.
27. For a general discussion of the Rule in Shelly's Case, see C. MOYNIHAN,
supra note 2, 141-50. The Rule in Shelley's Case survived into modern times
and played havoc with estate plans by enlarging to a full interest that which the
donor clearly intended to limit to a life estate. See, e.g., Lauer v. Hoffman, 241
Pa. 315, 88 A. 496 (1913) (purporting to apply Rule in Shelly's Case even
though testator expressly declared that he did not want life tenant to have more
than life interest). Today, most state legislatures have abrogated the Rule in

Shelly's Case. See C.

MOYNIHAN,

supra note 2, at 149-50.
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Title the heirs' interest was treated as a reversion and not a
28
remainder.
The rationale for all of these technical rules of conveyancing
which purported to prevent a hiatus or shift in seisin was to preserve the rights and privileges of the feudal overlord. They were
calculated to make it easier for him to determine who was, at any
particular time, in possession of a freehold interest (seisin) and
thus responsible for the feudal incidents. 29 It is noteworthy, however, that most of the rules just described continued to be employed and embellished long after feudal incidents had ceased to
be a significant factor in property law. The putative explanation
is that these rules were preserved so that courts could check the
landowners' power to impose elaborate remote future interests
on land which limited its transferability. In general, these rules
did operate as crude but ultimately effective checks on remote future interests which unreasonably impaired the free alienability of
real property. Increasingly, however, they became less effective
with the growing importance of personalty, the ownership of
which was never circumscribed by feudal rules.
These rules also became less effective with the increasing use
of equitable interests.3 0 Equitable interests were enforceable only
in Chancery, a court which never had accepted the formalism of
the law courts. 3 1 The Statute of Uses3 2 made it possible for a conveyance to create legal interests previously recognized only in equity. A new future interest, a springing use, could be created
28. The Doctrine of Worthier Title applies differently to inter vivos and
testamentary transfers. For testamentary transfers the doctrine requires the heir
to take by descent and not by devise because title by descent is "worthier" or
better title. Where A devises land "to my son Sam" and at A's death Sam is his
heir, Sam takes the land by descent, and not by devise. As applied to inter vivos
transfers, the doctrine prohibits the conveyor from creating a remainder in his
own heirs. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 151-61. Unlike the Rule in Shelly's
Case, one aspect of the Doctrine of Worthier Title has survived in modern law.
See Doctor v. Hughes, 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919). The case involved
property conveyed to a trustee. Income from the property was to go to one
person for life, then to that person's heirs. While the question was ultimately
one of intent, the presumed intention was that the interest following the life
interest would be a reversion and not a remainder. The case, although influential, has not been universally accepted. See, e.g., Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361
F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
29. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 142-43, 153.
30. See id. at 121 n.4 (most future interests today are equitable, not legal,
interests).
31. Id. at 171.
32. 1536, 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10. For a discussion of the historical basis for the
Statute of Uses, see 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 49 (1924).
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without a precedent estate."s Another new future interest, a shifting use, shifted an interest from one estate to another on the occurrence of some condition subsequent.3 4 The Statute of Wills 35
brought about a third new interest, an executory devise, similar to
the use but created in testamentary transfers. These three new
interests are referred to as "executory interests." The legal
model of conveyance did not fit executory interests, and it was
soon determined that they were not subject to the legal limitations of destructibility, the Rule in Shelley's Case, or the Doctrine
of Worthier Title. 3 6 An estate planner could thus avoid these old
limitations; in addition to the creation of a trust, a skilled planner
could create future interests other than contingent remainders, to
37
which the common law restrictions still applied.
Let us consider these developments. For four centuries, two
33. A springing use is an interest without a precedent supporting estate.
Such a use is to arise in the future out of the seisin of the grantors; this could
occur if there were no precedent estate at all or if a necessary gap or hiatus in
seisin were called for. A springing use would be created, for example, where on
July I A enfeoffs "to B and his heirs to the use of C and his heirs beginning on
August 1." There is a resulting use in A in fee for the month of July and on
August 1 the use springs up in favor of C. C's use is called a springing use. See
C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 174-76; see also L. SIMES, supra note 12, at 10-11.
34. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 175-78; see also L. SIMES, supra note 12,

at 10-12. A shifting use is one which cuts short a prior use estate in a person
other than the grantor. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 175-76. A shifting use
would be created, for example, where a donor makes a gift to a child but provides that if the child ever smokes or drinks alcoholic beverages, the property
will automatically pass to another named donee.
35. 1540, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 1. One consequence of the Statute of Uses was the
loss of the power to transmit a use estate by will. The landowning class resented
this limitation. C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 189. To appease them the Statute
of Wills was enacted. It gave tenants in fee simple a limited power to devise
their lands by a written will. Id.
36. See L. SIMES, supra note 12, at 11-12. This outcome became settled as
early as 1620 in the leading case of Pells v. Brown, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (K.B.
1620), reprinted in L. SIMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 32-35 (2d ed. 1951).
However, Pells v. Brown did not automatically cause a repudiation of the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders. Although executory interests
were deemed indestructible, it was nevertheless held that if at the time of its
creation an interest could take effect as a contingent remainder, it would not be
saved by being treated as executory but would continue to be subject to the
destructibility rule. See Purefoy v. Rogers, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1670); see also
Stehman v. Stehman, 1 Watts 466 (Pa. 1833).
This position was not universally accepted, and there were some courts that
repudiated the rule of destructibility altogether by treating the interest as executory to avoid a destruction. See Simonds v. Simonds, 199 Mass. 552, 556-57, 85
N.E. 860, 861-62 (1908).
37. See, e.g., L. SIMES, supra note 12, at 39-40 (describing successive trust for
life of life tenant to take effect if life tenant attempted to destroy contingent
remainder by merger or forfeiture).
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competing ideas of property alienation jostled for predominance
while the institutions of governance and dispute resolution
changed along with the economics of power and wealth. Land as
the primary source of power and wealth eventually ceded its position, at least in part, to movable property and, indeed, to intangible property. At this point, one might anticipate that the feudal
rationale for the attack on undue concentration of property in the
hands of a few had outlived its origins.
That was not the case. Perhaps nothing gives more credence
than the Rule Against Perpetuities to the idea that among the economic values embedded in our legal system is the concept that it
is undesirable to support the unfettered accumulation of wealth
through the mechanics and rubrics of the law. The Rule, invented incrementally by English courts toward the end of the
17th century, gave new life to that seemingly outdated social policy. In The Duke of Norfolk's Case38 the court noted:
A perpetuity is the Settlement [transfer] of an Estate
... with such Remainders expectant upon it, as are in no
Sort in the Power of the Tenant in . . . Possession, to
dock by any ... Assignment, but such Remainders must
continue as perpetual Clogs upon the Estate; such do
fight against God, for they pretend to such a Stability in
human Affairs, as the Nature of them admits not of, and
they are against the Reason and the Policy of the Law,
39
and therefore not to be endured.
The purposes served by The Rule are several: (1) to settle
the state of the law for planning purposes; (2) to provide a balance between the interest of the current owner of property to
prolong his or her control over it, and the interest of the future
owner to be able to put that property to his or her own use; (3) to
contribute to the increased mobility of wealth in society; and
(4) to permit property to be used effectively by its current owners
without having the value of their interests diminished by an
40
amount ascribable to the uncertain interests of others.
It is not the purpose of this brief historical survey to explore
all phases of The Rule in detail. In broad terms, The Rule largely
38. 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 3 Ch. Cas. 1 (1681).
39. Id. at 949, 3 Ch. Cas. at 31 (Nottingham, L.C.). For a discussion of The
Duke of Norfolk's Case, see Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand. Reflections
on the Origins of the Rule against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19 (1977).
40. See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Donative Transfers) 8-10
(1981) (introductory note to Part I).
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ignored the distinction between interests created in compliance
with the old feudal rules and those created outside of the feudal
system, either through a conveyance under the Statute of Uses or
through the creation of a modem beneficial interest in trust. The
Rule attempted to impose a unified requirement that any condition precedent on ownership (i.e., vesting) be so created that it
could not occur beyond the permissive period of a life or lives in
being plus 21 years. 4 1 Thus, it developed that The Rule had to be
satisfied in all events, regardless of whether the interest in ques42
tion was a contingent remainder or an executory interest.
On the other hand, when the interest was technically deemed
to be vested even though its enjoyment was delayed, The Rule
was not triggered. A possible explanation for this is that since the
vested interest carried with it a power of transfer, it was not within
the policy of The Rule. 43 At first, like the rules which had pre-

ceded it, The Rule may well have been considered to be a regulation of the power to create interests which would inhibit the
ability to transfer or convey a specific parcel of land. In this
sense, it was a more sophisticated version of the types of limitations previously considered. However, as personal property and
trusts assumed increasingly important roles, courts carried over
and applied The Rule at a relatively early date to beneficial interests held in trust even though the trustee's power to convey the
44
res of the trust was completely uninhibited.
It seems quite likely that the change in emphasis from a rule
which limited the creation of excessive interests in a specific piece
of real estate (which acted to inhibit the transferability of such
property) to a rule which prevented the creation of remote interests for beneficiaries in a trust is one which developed incrementally without any overt realization that it represented a
change in approach.
41. The permissive period for the rule was not fully determined in The Duke
of Norfolk's Case. It was soon settled, however, as a life in being plus 21 years or,
in other words, normally within the majority of a testator's grandchildren. See,
e.g.,Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186, 1187, 1 Cox 324, 325 (Ch. 1787), reprinted
in L. SIMES, supra note 36, at 571, 572.
42. SeeJ. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 202 (4th ed. 1942). For
a good summary of The Rule, see Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L.
REV. 638 (1938). For an updated summary, see R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1966).

43. See Leach, supra note 42, at 647 ("notion that a future estate can vest in
interest before it vests in possession is incorporated into the Rule against
Perpetuities").
44. See, e.g., Leake v. Robinson, 35 Eng. Rep. 979, 2 Mer. 363 (Ch. 1817),
reprinted in L. SIMES, supra note 36, at 609-14.
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Thus, the distinction between so called "vested interests"
and "contingent" or "executory" ones, which was crucial in the
application of The Rule, continued to be observed. 4 5 This distinction continued even though the original purpose in distinguishing between vested rights, which were freely alienable, and
contingent or executory interests, which traditionally were not
alienable, no longer had much relevance even in those jurisdictions which continued to limit the alienability of executory or con46
tingent interests.
While in theory The Rule was far superior to the earlier attempts at social control, it nevertheless left much to be desired.
Dissatisfaction with The Rule's operation has continued to the
present. That dissatisfaction seems to stem from the fact that,
more often than not, The Rule invalidates interests which are not
within its policy and exempts interests which are. Critics also frequently consider The Rule to be a trap for the unwary and unsophisticated drafter.
The criticism of The Rule focuses on several points. Courts
during the 18th and 19th centuries firmly established the doctrine
that if an interest was subject to any condition which by any possibility, no matter how remote, might come about at a distant period in
time, the interest should be "remorselessly" destroyed. 47 This
was how The Rule operated, regardless of the probability of the
event occurring, and regardless of the fact that a testator's expectations were frustrated on the basis of a largely theoretical
scruple.
For example, an interest was destroyed whenever it was subject to a condition which was measured by the lives of children of
living persons. Any living person, regardless of age or child-bearing propensity, was presumed to be capable of procreation.
Thus, a gift from A, a living person, to all of his children who
graduate from a given college would be invalid since it might include a child born after the gift was created and whose graduation
would therefore occur more than 21 years after the death of the
45. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2, at 121-22, 197; L. SIMES, supra note 12,
at 279.
46. See L. SIMES, supra note 12, at 254-55 (original rationale for The Rule
insufficient to explain subsequent applications).
47. This position was forcefully taken by the 19th century American
scholarJohn Chipman Gray. SeeJ. GRAY, supra note 42, § 2 (better if Rule called
"Rule against Remoteness"); id. §§ 268-278.4 (Chapter VII, "Interests, Though
Alienable, May Be Too Remote").
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parent. 48 So too, if an interest was conditioned upon an adminis-

trative contingency, 4 9 which according to common sense would
occur within a limited period of time, it might nevertheless be
destroyed if the contingency was one which had no theoretical
limit. This would follow even though there was no real danger of
50
the interest actually being too remote.
On the other hand, an interest carefully drafted with The
Rule in mind could be made to endure for generations without a
technical violation of The Rule. 5 ' That would be true even
though, as a remote interest, it would come within the policy of
The Rule. Thus, a careful drafter might delay the vesting of a
future interest until 21 years after the death of the survivor of an
entire group of persons. So long as the group were one reasonably capable of ascertainment and all of its members were described as existing when the instrument became operative, the
resulting interest would be valid even if the vesting were delayed
52
for more than a century.
Clearly, this result is contrary to the policy of The Rule.
Moreover, most American jurisdictions have held that reversionary interests" including remote reverters and rights of reentry, are
not within the proscriptions of The Rule although their ripening
48. Jee v. Audley, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186, 1 Cox 324 (Ch. 1787), reprintedin L.
SIMES, supra note 36, at 571-73 (70-year-olds might have children); Leake v.
Robinson, 35 Eng. Rep. 979, 2 Mer. 363 (Ch. 1817), reprinted in L. SIMES, supra
note 36, at 609-14.
49. See R. LYNN, supra note 42, at 59-60 (discussing "the administrative contingency" as prototype demonstrating "fantastic possibilities" aspect of The
Rule).
50. See Ryle v. Ryle (In re Bewick) [1910] 1 Ch. 116 (condition that beneficiaries be alive when existing mortgage on described property is completely paid
off held to be unlimited as to time and hence violative of The Rule); Johnson v.
Preston, 226 Ill. 447, 80 N.E. 1001 (1907) (condition precedent to vesting of
estate in execution of probate of testator's will held unlimited as to time and
hence violative of The Rule); see also Tullet v. Colville (In re Wood) [1894] 3 Ch.
381 (C.A.).
Some courts, however, have been willing to read a reasonable time into the
condition by necessary implication and thus validate the interests. See Belfield v.
Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 A. 585 (1893) (reading in reasonable time for condition of settlement of estate).
51. See generally L. SIMES, supra note 12, at 265-66 (readily ascertainable
group of living persons may be "life in being" under The Rule as long as interest will vest 21 years after death of one of them, but measuring lives must
neither be so numerous nor so situated that evidence of their deaths is likely to
be unreasonably difficult to obtain).
52. See Public Trustee v. Villar (In re Villar) [1929] 1 Ch. 243 (C.A.) (sustaining interest which deferred vesting until 20 years after death of last descendant of Queen Victoria who was alive at testator's death).
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might be delayed for generations. 53 Logically this might bejustified by treating the reversionary interest as something which the
donor did not create but that which was left in him when he conveyed less than all he had. Regardless of that logic, however, reversions were remote interests that operated as serious
impediments to title. Therefore, The Rule is simultaneously
over- and under-inclusive. Also, a so-called vested future interest
which will pass in enjoyment at a remote period of time might be
theoretically transferable but have little market for its present sale
at a reasonable price.
Although the classic ideal was that The Rule should be applied "remorselessly" to invalidate interests which in theory were
too remote, this ideal has never been followed literally. Through
construction, courts have frequently avoided some of the harshest
results of a violation of The Rule. Occasionally this was done in
order to preserve the main features of the testator's plan, and occasionally to rescue careless drafters from their own blunders.
Almost whenever possible, courts have construed interests as
vesting within the period of The Rule to avoid a violation. 54 In
addition, they have severed valid from invalid interests and only
invalidated the remote interests while permitting the remainder
of the disposition to stand. 55 This result was, of course, subject to
the limitation that it would not be applied when such partial validity would do greater violence to the intention of the donor or testator than would striking the entire plan. 56 Moreover, an interest
expressed on the basis of two alternative conditions, one of which
53. See Institution for Savings v. Roxbury Home for Aged Women, 244
Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1923) (possibility of reverter); see also Pruner's Estate,
400 Pa. 629, 640, 162 A.2d 626, 632 (1960) (held that executory devise violated
The Rule, but court noted that reversion and possibility of reverter following
base fee or fee simple determinable are not subject to The Rule).
54. See, e.g., Loring v. Blake, 98 Mass. 253 (1867) (upon testator's death,
son's interest in estate vests despite potential "unborn widow" problem arising
from creation of trust for any spouse of testatrix's children who die
subsequently).
55. See Cattlin v. Brown, 68 Eng. Rep. 1319, 11 Hare 372 (V.C. 1853); see
also American Sec. & Trust Co. v. Cramer, 175 F. Supp. 367 (D.D.C. 1959) (sustaining gifts to some subclasses even though gifts to other subclasses were invalidated as too remote). This practice is sometimes referred to as "vertical
separability." In re Harrah's Estate, 364 Pa. 451, 72 A.2d 587 (1950).
56. Under the doctrine of "infectious invalidity," if a partial acceptance of
the plan would create such a discrimination that a full intestacy would be more
consistent with the testamentary intention, the court may refuse to give effect to
a part of the plan and invalidate the entire disposition. See In re Morton's Estate,
454 Pa. 385, 312 A.2d 26 (1973) (distribution of entire estate by intestacy to
avoid inequality among testator's descendants); see also Taylor v. Dooley, 297
S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1956) (absolute gift to son which does not violate The Rule
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was valid and the other too remote, could be sustained, and the
invalid alternative ignored as surplusage if the valid condition
57
occurred.
Finally, courts have held that actual events which occur between the creation and the exercise of a power of appointment
control over theoretical possibilities.5 8 In other words, although
measurement would ordinarily be from the time the power was
created, as to events which occurred between the creation of the
power and its exercise, actual events would control the question
as to whether or not the interests created by the exercise of the
power of appointment violated The Rule. A similar approach had
also been applied when a trust was created inter vivos but the
settlor retained the power to revoke it during his or her lifetime.5 9
Consequently, in many instances in which the hardship attendant
upon a literal application of The Rule has been ameliorated by
construction, courts have in reality permitted actual events rather
than remote possibilities to control the disposition. This practice
is known as the wait-and-see approach. 60
More recently, many modern jurisdictions have gone even
further to avoid invalidating an entire interest when there is a
technical violation of The Rule. At the turn of this century, courts
began exercising a power to alter or amend an instrument to
make it comply with The Rule when such an alteration or amendment would come closer to the testator's intention than would
traditional destruction of the interest. This power, frequently
falls along with remote trust for daughter's family which violates The Rule when
testator exhibits intention to treat son and daughter's progeny equally).
57. See Sears v. Coolidge, 329 Mass. 340, 342-43, 108 N.E.2d 563, 565
(1952) (so far as gift depends upon alternative event which satisfies Rule it is
good); Quinlan v. Wickman, 233 Ill. 39, 47, 84 N.E. 38, 40 (1908) (same).
58. See In re Warren's Estate, 320 Pa. 112, 182 A. 396 (1936); see also Minot
v. Paine, 230 Mass. 514, 120 N.E. 167 (1918).
59. Sears, 329 Mass. at 340, 108 N.E.2d at 563 (trust which reserved power
of appointment to settlor, remainder after termination of trust to "youngest surviving grandchild of mine who shall be living at my death," was valid when no
other grandchildren were born and settlor could have limited class of remainder
to living grandchildren anytime before his death).
60. See generally L. SIMES, supra note 12, at 269-75 (discussing modern trend

of wait-and-see approach).
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misnamed "cy pres," 6 1 is based on equitable principles. 62 Thus,
if A were to create a trust for the benefit of the children of B (a
living person) conditioned on such children surviving to age 30,
some courts would reduce the age qualification to 21 so that the
beneficiary would be required to qualify within the permissible

time of the life of B plus 21 years. 63 Many scholars, legislatures
and a few courts have opted spontaneously for an even more
thorough reform. They have either advocated or adopted the position that no interest should be stricken as violative of The Rule
unless it has in fact failed to vest before the permissive period has
64
expired.
The obvious problem is the planning uncertainty involved
when a valid-invalid determination analysis is coupled with a waitand-see determination date. The wait-and-see analysis may well
be an overreaction to the excessive formalities previously outlined in applying The Rule. 65 Nevertheless, if there is a discern-

ible social purpose in controlling the creation of remote interests
in long-standing trusts, and if The Rule is not triggered until the
end of the permissive period (which may easily exceed a century),
certainly The Rule fails to further the requisite social purposes.
61. See id. at 275 (naming this power "cy pres"). In a strict sense, the cy
pres power operates only on charitable trusts. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS 520 (6th ed.
1987) (cy pres power "is confined to charitable trusts"); In re Rood Estate, 41
Mich. App. 405,415-18, 200 N.W.2d 728, 734-36 (1972) (before applying power
court must find valid charitable trust); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399
(1959) (defining doctrine). The power's name derives from the French "cy pres
comme possible" ("as near as possible"). G. BOGERT, supra, at 520. The usage has
extended to describe instances of effectuating a grantor's intention concerning
other property interests.
62. See Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 465-66, 31 A. 900, 911 (1891); see
also In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 52 Haw. 40, 43, 469 P.2d 183, 185
(1970) (The Rule, as judge-made, is subject to judicial change).
63. See Chun Quan Yee Hop, 52 Haw. at 46-47, 469 P.2d at 187 (where will
expressly provided that "trust shall cease and determine upon the death of my
wife ... or thirty" years from testator's death, court reduced 30 years to 21 in
order to bring trust within The Rule). The Hawaii court uses the term "equitable approximation" as well as "cy pres." Id. at 46 & n.8, 469 P.2d at 187 & n.8.
64. See, e.g.,
In re Estate of Pearson, 442 Pa. 172, 275 A.2d 336 (1971) (applying Estates Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 100, § 4 (now codified in substantially
similar form at 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104 (Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1989),
which adopts wait-and-see approach)); see also North Bay Council, Inc. v. Grinnell, 123 N.H. 321, 324, 461 A.2d 114, 116 (1983) (more concerned with carrying out testator's intention than applying Rule remorselessly).
65. For a discussion of these formalities, see supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
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III.

THE GENERATION-SKIPPING TAX:

A FEDERAL

PERPETUITIES RULE

The Internal Revenue Code imposes a generation-skipping
tax on certain devolutions of interests in trusts to generations remote from the grantor.6 6 Unlike The Rule, the generation-skipping tax does not invalidate multi-generation transfers; it simply
makes them more expensive. However, the added expense of the
tax indirectly discourages the extraordinary accumulation of
property in the hands of related persons over an extended period
of time.
Like The Rule to some extent, the generation-skipping tax is
the product of legislative application of the underlying policy
against Homeric concentrations of wealth through the manipulation of settled legal rules that control inheritance.6 7 Its development time has been ;omewhat shorter, however: seven decades
68
rather than seven centuries.
The Internal Revenue Code addresses transfers of property
by inheritance on three fronts. It imposes an estate tax on transfers of property occasioned by death,6 9 a gift tax on inter vivos
transfers, 70 and a generation-skipping tax applicable to interests
in trust that span several generations which, but for that tax,
7
would not incur federal estate tax. '
As noted at the outset of this article, 72 the modern estate tax
was crafted in 1916 as a revenue-raising device, but with a view to
providing a disincentive for the unfettered and tax-free accumulation of wealth. At that time, many but not all of the states had
inheritance taxes, and the rates varied considerably among those
that did. 73 The result was an enticement to the wealthy to shop
for the cheapest domicile in which to die. In 1924 Congress
66. The tax on generation-skipping transfers is contained in Chapter 13 of
the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 (West 1989).
67. For a discussion of this policy against the concentration of wealth, see
supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
68. The first estate tax in the United States was adopted in 1916. See supra
note 6. The Rule was an outgrowth of the development of the law of real property and estates which began in the Middle Ages. See C. MOYNIHAN, supra note 2,
at 25-26.
69. I.R.C. §§ 2001-2210 (West 1989).
70. Id. §§ 2501-2524.
71. Id. §§ 2601-2663.
72. See supra note 6.
73. As of 1912, 38 states had enacted inheritance tax provisions. See P.

Ross,

INHERITANCE TAXATION

(1912). For a compilation of state provisions then

in effect, see id. at 391-778.
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amended the estate tax to allow a finite credit for state inheritance
taxes. 74 As a result, states that did not have an inheritance tax
adopted one, and most states geared their rates to the maximum
amount allowable as a federal credit. Considerable uniformity
among the states resulted.
Early on, tax planners noted that inter vivos gifts were an effective way around the federal estate tax. In 1924 Congress enacted a gift tax to solve the problem. 75 In 1942 the Code was
amended to solve the problem raised by the estate tax disparity in
treatment between community property and separate property
states. 76 In 1948 a marital deduction was added as another equal77
ization device.
However, a rate differential between the tax on inter vivos
gifts and transfers at death continued to provide an incentive for
wealthy persons to make gifts during their lives. In 1976 Congress restructured the Code to provide a unified tax regime for
inter vivos gifts and estates. 78 In general the estate tax base includes gifts made during life, and gift tax paid is taken into account in determining estate tax liability. 79 The generation80
skipping tax was also introduced in that year.

As noted above, the estate tax is levied on the transfer of an

interest in property occasioned by the death of its owner.8 1 The
74. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 301(b), 43 Stat. 253, 303 (current version at I.R.C. § 2011 (West 1989)).
75. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §§ 319-324, 43 Stat. 253, 313-16 (previously codified at I.R.C. §§ 1131-1136 (West 1928)). This tax was repealed in
1926, Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200, 44 Stat. 9, 125 (repealing I.R.C.
§§ 1131-1136 (West 1928)), but later reenacted in 1932. Gift Tax Act of 1932,
ch. 209, § 532, 47 Stat. 169, 245-59 (previously codified at I.R.C. §§ 550-580
(1934)). The current version of the gift tax was enacted in 1954 and is codified
as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 (West 1989).
76. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, §§ 402(a)-(b), 403(a), 404(a), 56 Stat.
798, 941-42, 944 (previously codified at I.R.C. § 811 (d)(s), (e)(2), (g)(4) (Supp.
1941-42)). However, these provisions were short-lived, being repealed in 1948.
Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 351(a), 62 Stat. 110, 116.
77. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168 § 361(a), 62 Stat. 110, 117-19 (current
version at I.R.C. § 2056 (West 1989)).
78. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001, 90 Stat. 1520,
1846-54 (codified as amended at scattered sections of I.R.C. (West 1989)).
79. I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2012 (West 1989).
80. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2006, 90 Stat. 1520,
1879-90 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2601-2662 (West 1989)).
81. Section 2001 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides: "A tax
is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate .... " I.R.C. § 2001(a)
(West 1989). (Hereafter, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986). Section 2051 defines the taxable estate as the gross estate minus deductions. Id. § 2051. Section 2031 defines the gross estate as the value of all real or
personal property to the extent provided for in §§ 2031-2046. Id. § 2031. Sec-
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termination of a life estate was not considered a transfer for either
estate or gift tax purposes.8 2 As a result, it was possible to avoid
or postpone estate tax with a trust that provided for successive
life estates. In addition, under the pre-1977 Code rules, a beneficiary of a trust that extended beyond his or her own life could
have the economic benefits that were the near equivalent of ownership of trust assets without being considered the owner for es83
tate transfer tax purposes.
Those two factors-prolonged tax deferral and present economic control-made generation-skipping trusts an attractive device for persons wealthy enough to be able to set aside significant
assets in trust. In contrast, moderately well-to-do persons were
not normally in a position to alienate substantial assets in trust
form and so were stuck with the estate tax as their assets passed
from generation to generation.
The 1976 Act 8 4 established a separate tax that was not dependent upon the existence of a transfer in the estate tax sense.
Instead, the tax was imposed on the downstream shift of an interest or power in trust property, a life estate, or remainder, from
85
the generation below the grantor to a succeeding generation.
However, the 1976 generation-skipping tax proved to be unduly
tion 2033 includes in the gross estate "the value of all property to the extent of
the interest therein of the decedent .... " Id. § 2033.
82. H.R. REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 46 (1976).
83. Such economic benefits included the right to receive income from the
trust; the power to invade the corpus in certain circumstances; the power to
draw down an annual, limited amount of the value of the corpus; the power to
appoint the corpus by deed or will to anyone other than himself, his estate, his
creditors or the creditors of his estate; and the right to manage the trust property as trustee. Id.
84. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
85. The Internal Revenue Code, as enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
provided that "[a] tax is hereby imposed on every generation-skipping transfer
"I.R.C.
..
§ 2601 (1976). Section 2611 of the Code defined a "generationskipping transfer" as a taxable distribution or termination "with respect to a
generation-skipping trust or trust equivalent." Id. § 2611. A "generation-skipping trust" was any trust having beneficiaries belonging to two or more generations younger than the grantor's. Id. §§ 2611(b), 2613(c)(1). A "generationskipping trust equivalent" was any non-trust arrangement having substantially
the same effect as a generation-skipping trust, specifically including life estates
and remainders. Id. § 2611 (d)(1)-(2) (1976). A "taxable distribution" was any
distribution (other than that of income) from a trust or trust equivalent from a
beneficiary belonging to a generation below the grantor to a beneficiary belonging to a succeeding generation. Id. § 2613(a)(1). A "taxable termination" was
the termination of an interest (defined as the right to receive income or corpus)
or a power (defined as a power to establish or alter beneficial enjoyment of the
income or corpus) of a member of a generation below the grantor's in a trust or
trust equivalent. Id. § 2613(b)(1), (d)(l)-(2).
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difficult to administer, and in some instances it could be avoided
through effective planning. As a result, the 1986 Act 8 6 revamped
the mechanism, and the 1988 Act 8 7 refined it.
To recapitulate with more particularity, the federal estate tax
imposes a tax at rates which graduate from eighteen percent to
fifty-five percent of the net estate after deductions for debts, administrative expenses and so forth. 88 The tax structure includes a
credit against the federal estate tax which has the effect of rendering tax free the first $600,000 of the net estate.8 9 Any amounts
that pass solely to or for the benefit of a surviving spouse are exempt from estate tax, provided that they would be considered taxable to the estate of the surviving spouse should he or she still
own those assets at the time of death. 90 Gifts will qualify for this
treatment if they are inheritable interests or, in some cases, if on
receiving them the executor elects to treat them for estate tax
purposes as though they were inheritable. 9' Qualified gifts to
92
qualified charities also enjoy a tax exemption.
The estate tax is levied on assets that pass directly as a part of
the probate estate. It is also imposed on most will substitutes in
which, although an inter vivos gift in form, the decedent has re93
tained significant property interests during his lifetime.
86. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
87. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100647, 102 Stat. 3342.
88. The highest rate is temporarily set at 55% until 1993, at which time the
permanent rate of 50% is phased in. I.R.C. § 2001(c) (West 1989).
89. Id. § 2010.

90. Id. § 2056.
91. Id. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(V).
92. Id. § 2055.
93. The question as to what types of inter vivos transfers are to be included
as a part of the estate for estate tax purposes is an exceedingly complex one,
covered by several sections of the Code. In general, the Code provides for the
inclusion of property in the estate for tax purposes when the donor has retained:
(1) a life interest either for himself or for those over whom he retains a power of
appointment, id. § 2036; (2) a power to revoke the transfer, id. § 2038; (3) an
interest only effective with reference to the donor's death coupled with a reversionary interest valued in excess of 5% the value of the gift, id. § 2037; or
(4) rights of ownership over certain annuities or life insurance proceeds, id.
§§ 2039, 2042. In addition, where the donee of a general power of appointment
has the power to appoint either to himself, his creditors, his estate or creditors
of his estate, the property is included in his estate. Id. § 2041. The Code makes
special provisions with respect to joint owners. In the absence of a gift tax return at the time of the creation of a joint interest, the entire amount is taxed to
the individual whose funds contributed to its creation when he is the first to die.
Id. §§ 2012, 2040. Moreover, the presumption is created when one co-owner
dies that his funds were used to acquire the interest, and the burden is on the
surviving co-owner to establish the contrary. Id. § 2040.
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The federal gift tax was designed to fill a gap in the taxation
of the wealth distribution process. 9 4 The present tax purports to
adopt the same rates as the estate tax. 95 The rates operate somewhat differently, however, since the federal gift tax is computed
on a tax-exclusive basis rather than a tax-inclusive basis. 96 The
tax credit previously referred to in connection with the estate
tax9 7 is also available for the gift tax. 98 However, it is a unified
credit in the sense that to the extent that the decedent's estate
claims the credit for gift taxes, it is no longer available for estate
tax purposes. 99 In further effort to coordinate the two taxes, a
taxable gift made during the lifetime of the taxpayer is included in
the computation of the size of the estate for purposes of determining the applicable graduated estate tax rate.' 0 0 The marital
and charitable deductions referred to' 01 in connection with the
02
estate tax are equally available for the gift tax.'
The gift tax also contains one additional feature, an annual
exclusion.10 3 A taxpayer may, in any single year, make a $10,000
gift ($20,000 if married and his or her spouse consents)10 4 to each
05
beneficiary who has received an unqualified present interest.
That is, the first $10,000 (or $20,000) is not included in the gift
tax base.
Finally, as the last step in its coordinated effort to tax the
wealth distribution process attending the death of the property
owner, Congress instituted the generation-skipping tax. That tax
94. See C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. McCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES 640 (3d ed. 1974). For a discussion of the history of the gift tax, see supra
note 75.
95. I.R.C. § 2502 (West 1989).
96. Id. In other words, in the computation of the gift tax the amount of the
tax which is paid by the donor is not added to the amount of the gift for tax
purposes. On the other hand, under the estate tax the tax is levied on the gross
amount without any deduction for the estate tax imposed. Id. § 2001.
97. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
98. I.R.C. § 2505 (West 1989).
99. Id.§§ 2001, 2010, 2505.
100. Id. § 2001.
101. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
102. I.R.C. §§ 2522, 2523 (West 1989).
103. Id. § 2503(b).
104. Id. § 2513 (gift by one spouse treated as made one-half by each
spouse).
105. Id. § 2503. A difficult question sometimes arises as to what constitutes
a present gift which is eligible for the annual exclusion. For a general discussion
of the problem, see F. ROTHMAN & L. LEVIN, PROBATE LAW AND TAXATION OF
TRANSFERS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES

§§ 2014-2015 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
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was the result of a conscious effort to achieve a result akin to that
to which The Rule was directed.
Congress was concerned with the ability and proclivity of the
wealthy to avoid the generation-by-generation impact that the estate tax had on persons who were unable to tie up substantial assets in the form of a generation-skipping trust. 10 6 When
Congress enacted the generation-skipping tax it looked to the effect of The Rule which limited the duration of trusts.' 0 7
Therefore, both the generation-skipping tax and The Rule
have the same purpose: they seek to coerce property owners to
arrange their affairs so that transfers of property will occur after
their deaths. While the aim is the same, the penalty for failure to
comply differs. With the generation-skipping tax, the absence of
an actual transfer event gives rise to a deemed transfer event and
the wealth passing downstream is diminished by the amount of
the tax.' 0 8 Under The Rule, the penalty is to void the arrange106. In its explanation of the rationale for the generation-skipping tax, the
1976 Senate Report pointed out:
[One] purpose of the Federal estate and gift taxes is . . . to raise
revenue . . . in a manner which has as nearly as possible a uniform
effect, generation by generation .... [That policy is] best served where
the transfer taxes ... are imposed, on the average, at reasonably uniform intervals. [That policy is] frustrated where the imposition of such
taxes is deferred for very long intervals, as is possible, under present
law, through the use of generation-skipping trusts.
Generation skipping ... reduces the progressive effect of the transfer taxes, since families with moderate levels of accumulated wealth
may pay as much or more in cumulative transfer taxes as wealthier families who utilize generation-skipping devices.
... [T]he committee.., believes that the tax laws should be neutral and that there should be no tax advantage available in setting up
trusts. Consequently, the committee amendment provides that property passing from one generation to successive generations in trust
form should, for estate tax purposes, be treated substantially the same
as property which is transferred outright from one generation to a successive generation ....
S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 19-20 (1976).
107. The 1976 Senate Report noted:
Currently, all States (except Wisconsin and Idaho) have a rule against
perpetuities which limits the duration of a trust.... [1In general, such
laws require that the ownership of property held in trust must vest in
the beneficiaries not later than the period of the lifetime of any "life in
being" on the date of the transfer, plus 21 years (and 9 months)
thereafter.
Id. at 19.
108. Deemed transfer events include taxable distributions, taxable terminations and direct skips. I.R.C. § 2611(a) (West 1989). The generation-skipping
tax is imposed upon the taxable amounts of these deemed transfers. Id.
§§ 2601, 2621-2623. For a discussion of the taxation of direct skips, see infra
notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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ment and thereby recast it in a form in which alienation is not
impermissibly fettered. 0 9 As a result, under the current generation-skipping provisions,"l 0 if a testator purports to create successive life estates for various generations, the tax would be
triggered on the death of each successive generation having a life
estate even though the interest of the life tenant was not inheritable and therefore not subject to an estate transfer tax."'
Moreover, the tax is levied on "direct skips." ' 1 2 This means
that even if a prior generation receives no life interest, a generation-skipping tax is triggered by a direct gift to a person who is
more than one generation below the donor whose parents are
alive at the time of the gift.11 3 The tax is levied as each generation becomes entitled to distribution,' 14 and it is at the highest
available estate tax rate, currently fifty-five percent.115
Congress' overt embrace of the public policy against allowing
economic perpetuities in the transfer tax area was not all-encompassing. The 1986 Act revision of the generation-skipping tax
provided an exemption of up to $1 million for each individual
transferor who makes a generation-skipping transfer. 116 To implement the exemption, specific property is identified as exempt
and thereafter all subsequent appreciation in value of that exempt
l7
property is immune from the generation-skipping tax."
For example, assume the grantor transfers $1 million in trust
for his or her grandchildren and allocates the full amount of her
exemption to the trust. Thereafter, no part of the trust will ever
be subject to the generation-skipping tax, even if it eventually appreciates in value ten-fold. 1 18
The exclusion is obviously at complete odds with the general
policy of the generation-skipping tax, and it can be expected to
encourage long-lasting inflexible trusts, with The Rule as their
109. See L. SIMES, supra note 36, at 608.
110. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2662 (West 1989).
111. See AM.JUR. 2D FEDERAL TAXATION, A COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE 1986
TAX REFORM ACT (RIA)
1421, at 747 (1986) (citing I.R.C. § 2653).
112. I.R.C. § 2611 (West 1989).
113. Id. §§ 2612-2613.
114. Id. §§ 2611(a)(1), 2612(b).
115. Id. §§ 2641, 2001(c). As previously noted, the highest rate is scheduled to be reduced automatically under current law after 1992. Id. § 2001(c).
116. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1431(c), 100 Stat.
2085, 2721.
117. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 1265 (Joint Comm. Print 1987).
118. Id.
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only temporal limitation. And because, at least as Congress
viewed it, only the wealthy can be expected to tie up assets of the
magnitude required to take full advantage of the exclusion, the
provision points firmly in the direction of encouraging undue accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few.
Lest it be thought that the exclusion is the whimper of the
generation-skipping tax's bang, consider that $1 million compounded daily at 10% will reach $10 million in approximately
twenty-four years. Or, in the alternative, assume that a grantor
establishes a trust, funds it with $1 million, and designates the
trust assets as exempt. The trust has five beneficiaries. The cash
is used to buy a $5 million life insurance policy on the life of a
person as to whom there is an insurable interest, the more elderly
the better. When he or she dies, the insurance proceeds are distributed equally to the five beneficiaries, each of whom sets up a
trust funded by his or her $1 million, designates the trust for his
or her individual generation-skipping tax exclusion, and goes in
search of an elderly potential insured.
IV.

So WHAT?

Logic could lead one to argue that a social policy device first
of sevsculpted to prevent the aggregation of assets in the hands
eral hundred noble families at a time when London, the largest
city in the common law world, had less than 10,000 inhabitants,
has outlived its justification. While certain ownership behavior
patterns were politically and economically undesirable for a feudal sovereign, these patterns do not present a clear danger in our
modern society. However, that forty-eight states have The Rule
firmly embedded in the body of their current law, 119 and Congress has recognized it as a rationale for the generation-skipping
tax,' 20 suggest that the policy remains vital.
In other words, even today property held under alienation
strictures improperly detracts from the mobility of wealth to meet
the needs of current owners where those needs could not have
been forecast by the original owner. In addition, taxing the devolution of control of wealth from one generation to another without regard to the legal formalities of transfer causes each
generation to contribute to the satisfaction of the national federal
tax burden with greater uniformity and equality.
119. See S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 19 (1976).
120. For a discussion of Congress' consideration of The Rule in enacting
the tax, see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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There is an implicit quantitative assumption involved in applying this policy. The larger the amount of wealth that can be
accumulated or restricted within the present frameworks of the
tax system and The Rule, the greater is the presumed level of
societal concern. When the amount involved is relatively small,
arguably no substantial public interest is impaired, even if the
amount is tied up over an inordinate period of time. This is
plainly the congressional perception as expressed in the $10,000
(or $20,000) annual gift tax exclusion, and in the $600,000 unified credit exclusion. Both of these exclusions are techniques for
narrowing the tax base and thereby focusing the brunt of the tax
on the very wealthy, who are most likely to accumulate undue
wealth.
For the purposes of The Rule, it is more difficult to pinpoint
a manifestation of the same de minimis approach. On its face,
The Rule is an all-or-nothing sanction: The Rule either is or is
not violated. A case may fall within the prohibition of The Rule
even though the amount involved is so small that its public policy
impact is minimal. However, the judicial response to The Rule
has been to create subtle and frequently tortuous constructions in
aggrieved cases, perhaps in an attempt to balance individual wel21
fare against the tug of the formal policy.'
In a sense, the generation-skipping tax is also an all-or-nothing sanction. After overreaching the limits of the available exemptions, a single rate is applied.' 2 2 No gradations are available.
Both The Rule and the tax can "cut," but when they do it is
with a very dull blade. Undoubtedly that is the result of the failure to clearly articulate, in other than a historical or highly reactive manner, the policy that underpins both.
Is there a better way to address the perceived goals of the
policy? Since The Rule and the generation-skipping tax have the
same policy target, why sustain both? What if a single system
could be devised that is sensitive to the degree of the public interest involved while it continues to further the desired policy?
A taxing scheme seems to be particularly suitable for such a
system. The tax rate might vary based not only upon the amount
involved but also upon the potential length of time that the trust
121. See, e.g., Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 A. 585 (1893) (court refused to "presume" that administration of 14-year trust could last seven years
and possibly violate The Rule).
122. For a discussion of the generation-skipping tax rate and the available
exemptions, see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
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or other device for tying up the property is likely to remain in
effect. This procedure might call for a merger of the present estate, gift and generation-skipping taxes, and the total abandonment of The Rule.
Instead of a generation-skipping tax at one stiff rate, graduated rates could apply based on the number of generations which
stand between the beneficiary and the original testator or donor.
Moreover, any exemption might be temporarily limited in time to
a single generation so that, regardless of amount, the tax would
be triggered for future generations. The tax rate might be set
ultimately to reach a confiscatory level so that it would operate
similarly to the flat prohibition of The Rule. But to account for
the direct proportional relationship between the amount involved
and the degree of societal concern, the tax would only reach that
point in graduated stages. It would thus be incrementally more
expensive to tie property up through several generations and the
disincentive would increase with the potential amount involved.
In the case of direct skips or gifts directly to a junior generation (whose ancestors remain alive), an additional surcharge of
twenty-five percent of the normal tax might be levied for each
generation skipped, beginning at the immediate succeeding generation of the testator's or donor's children (or the equivalent
generational level). Again, this tax structure might maintain a
limited exemption for a single generation. If the gift were of successive interests to several generations, such as a trust which provides income in turn for children, grandchildren and beyond, the
present generation-skipping tax might be retained so that as each
generation succeeds to the trust interest a new tax would accrue,
calculated at the same graduation rate as though the gift had been
given directly to such beneficiaries from the settlor or testator.
There remains the problem of the creation of an interest of
potentially indefinite duration on the occurrence of a condition
which has no stated outside time limit. Historically, an alternate
gift made in the event that the first taker's line of lineal descendants expired would have created such an interest. A gift for a special purpose such as a direct charitable gift which provided that
the gift was to pass to an alternate beneficiary if the charitable
purpose failed could also have created such an interest (through
the termination of the charitable beneficiary, for example, or its
disqualification from charitable status under existing Code rules).
Part of this problem might be eliminated through construction. Thus, a court might read into such a gift a reasonable time
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after which the possibility of such interest accruing would have
expired. If that is administratively impractical, then after a fixed
statutory period (for example, twenty years), a deemed option
might be conferred on the potential owner. He could either pay a
tax calculated at twenty five percent more than the original tax
actually levied (or if the original gift were to a charity, the amount
that would have been levied) or execute a release of his interest.
If the ownership of such an interest were in unascertained or nonexistent persons, an appropriate probate court might be given the
authority, if it did not already have it, to designate a guardian ad
litem or trustee to represent the interests and to act on their
behalf.
The regime just outlined would render The Rule unnecessary as a means of social control over property owners' efforts to
tie up wealth for excessively long periods after their deaths. Governmental control of such conduct would thus shift from the judiciary to the tax sector and The Rule would become as irrelevant
to modern social policy as the destructibility of contingent remainders and the Rule in Shelly's Case.' 23
Given an overt and well-articulated embodiment of the perceived public policy in the federal tax structure, the states could
be comfortable with the affirmative repeal of The Rule in their
jurisdictions. In the alternative, conservative jurisdictions might
want to retain The Rule, but adopt the "wait-and-see" approach
which would avoid an accidental violation of The Rule (which was
all too frequent an occurrence at common law). The states might
then statutorily prescribe an ultimate time limit beyond which no
interest could be tied up. That limit would more or less coincide
with the time at which, under the revised generation-skipping tax
approach, the tax burden imposed would become prohibitive in
any event.
The suggested reform would shift primary responsibility for
control to the federal government's tax sector. In view of the increase in geographic mobility, as evidenced by the fact that people tend readily to change their domiciles from one state to
another, the degree of uniformity that such a shift would produce
is entirely desirable.
A uniform rule of the sort proposed here would cost the
states nothing, and their domiciliaries would gain the benefit of
being able to plan their affairs by reference to only one set of
123. For a discussion of destructibility of contingent remainders and the
Rule in Shelley's Case, see supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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complex rules instead of two. The federal government would
lose no revenue; indeed a revenue gain might well occur. True,
the Internal Revenue Service would have the responsibility of administration, but that burden would be an incremental rather
than an exponential increase over that which it currently bears
under the present generation-skipping tax.
The resulting tax statute would be complex. But from the
standpoint of the property-owning taxpayers affected, or more
precisely their professional advisors, at present both The Rule
and the generation-skipping tax are separately complex, particularly when The Rule itself is not uniform in its manifestations
among the states, and the effective planner for mobile clients
must now attempt to foresee which states' rules might apply in
the future.
The first modern income tax act was titled "An Act To ...
24
provide revenue for the Government, and for other purposes." 1
Since then, Congress has enthusiastically embraced the "other
purposes" warrant to regulate through the Code diverse affairs
ranging from international commercial morality 2 5 to the collec126
tion of child support payments in arrears under state law.
Therefore, it is not a quantum leap to use the federal tax structure to further the public policy of regulating the alienation of
property presently in the hands of future decedents. Such a system, it is submitted, would curb unacceptable modes of excess
wealth accumulation without unduly restricting socially acceptable processes of wealth distribution under established rules of
inheritance.
124. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 16, § f II, 38 Stat. 114.
125. I.R.C. §§ 162(c), 952(a)( 4 ) (West 1988 & Supp. 1989) (bribes and
"grease" payments paid to foreign government officials); id. §§ 952(a)(3), 999
(income from foreign country engaged in international boycott).
126. I.R.C. § 6402(c) (West 1989).
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